Miller v. Alabama: Constitutionality of Mandatory Life Sentences Without Parole for Minors

In a combined case, the Supreme Court looks at the constitutionality of mandatory sentences of life without parole for a convicted person who is under 18. The citation is: 132 S. Ct. 2455

Background:

In one case a 14 year old boy from Arkansas was convicted of a felony murder when his friend brought a shotgun to a store, they robbed the store, and the co-conspirator killed the store clerk. In the second case originating from Alabama, another 14 year old and his friend were convicted of murder in the course of arson. In both situations the law declared that the convicted person be handed a mandatory life sentence without parole; there was no post-conviction discretion for the court before handing down a sentence.

The challenges in these cases were based not in the conviction of the youths, but in the validity of mandatory life without parole sentences for minors. The attorneys argued whether the mandatory sentences were excessive under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits, among other things, excessive punishment. The question the court looked at, in lay-terms, was whether the Eighth Amendment, conveyed to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, could bar the mandatory sentencing of a child to life without parole given that a child stands under a different set of culpability rules than an adult does.

Legal Precedent:

The watershed case to discuss the culpability and sentencing repercussions for children is Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551, backed almost immediately by Graham v. Florida. This case, Miller, represents both an advance on this line of cases, and a divergence.

1. A.      In Roper, the Supreme Court examined whether a minor who commits murder, even first degree murder, can be sentenced to death. First, the court discussed that the death penalty is an extreme punishment, requiring careful and restrained usage. Second, the court examined the manners in which juveniles are different from adult, citing three factors. One, children lack maturity and often rush into impetuous and “ill-considered actions.” Two, children are especially vulnerable to peer pressures and negative influences- creating a situation where they can be pushed towards decisions they may not otherwise make. Finally, the court pointed out that a child is not fully formed, in character or in mental capacity. Therefore, where an adult may disregard some action because it goes against their nature, a child may not have a full concept of what their nature is, and may not have the ability to disregard that same action. Thus, the court determined that in a moral world, a juvenile, being subject to these three characteristics, cannot have the same level of culpability of an adult. When culpability is lessened, then the justifications for the death penalty also are lessened, and become blurred when applied to minors. Looking to the deterrence factor and the punishment factor of the death penalty as applied to minors, the Court found the death penalty disproportionate to any crime a minor could commits, and found that it would be excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment; the death penalty for minors became unconstitutional.

1. B.      Graham is a more narrow holding, originating from a parole violation for a juvenile offender who had committed multiple home invasions and been caught while fleeing arrest. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Using Atkins v. Virginia, its progeny, and Roper, the Court looked to what the national consensus on the morality of allowing a sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders. After doing an in-depth review of statistics regarding sentencing structures for juveniles in non-homicide cases, and extrapolating the three factors lessening the culpability of children discussed in Roper, the Court draws a line. “Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,” the court proclaims, and determines that the reality of the situation, wherein a 16 year old receives the same so-called sentence as a 75 year old, is a reality that is unacceptable. The Court created a categorical rule, finding that a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for a juvenile non-homicide offender was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Legal Analysis:

Miller is, in itself, a narrow holding. I do not believe that it will do much for the world of juvenile sentencing except force a small (albeit important) change in the sentencing procedure when faced with a mandatory sentencing structure. The court is very specific in its holding. This case advances this line of holdings through protection of children, but diverges in that it looks only at a mandatory sentence- not at discretionary sentencing like the previous cases did.

The first step in this decision was to note the penological problems with treating certain sentences as the same for adults and children. Part of this examination addressed the problems of punishment vs retribution vs rehabilitation, but the majority of this examination was focused on those three factors Roper identified. Recognizing that precedent has established that children are “constitutionally different from adults for the purposes of sentencing,” the Court continued its trek in growing movement away from harsh punishment for juvenile offenders.

The second step (obviously) followed from that route; where Roper had laid the groundwork for justification of different punishment scales for minors, Graham showed that life without parole is a significantly different sentence for minors than t is for adults, and that the states were beginning to realize this fact. Nothing in Graham required this reasoning to be crime specific; the reasoning was broadly applicable, the holding was narrow in focus. The Supreme Court took that broad reasoning to the level of mandatory sentences- relying especially upon the fact that life without parole sentences were likened to death sentences.

But in the end this case only narrowly protects children from a sentence. The Supreme Court holds only that a minor cannot face a statutorily mandated life sentence without parole. Theoretically then, a minor may still face a mandatory life sentence (with parole possible) or a life sentence without parole if it is within the judge’s discretion to give this sentence. This is very like the Court; categorical rules are difficult to obtain, and when given, are narrow.

Predictions:

I expect that if a non-mandatory life sentence for a juvenile were to make its way to the Supreme Court, without change in the make-up of the Court, a life sentence for a juvenile could be found unconstitutional. The same concepts which have made mandatory life sentences wholly unconstitutional for minors, can make discretionary life sentences unconstitutional for minors.

Minors lack the same culpability as adults, and have been declared constitutionally different for the purposes of sentencing. Additionally, Graham painstakingly lays out that a life sentence is starkly different for a minor than it is for an adult- especially when the minor is particularly young. When combined, the lessened culpability for minors and the extreme nature of a life sentence create the ideal situation for a life sentence to be excessive in the face of modern mores and cruel and unusual under the Eight Amendment. Additionally, Graham allows further extrapolation to non-mandatory life sentences because it rejects that life sentences should be looked at as falling under the term of years analysis, meaning that the Court is looking at the evolving social feelings on the matter and not at constitutional excess of the sentence. I think this will further the allowance of a finding that any life without parole sentence for a juvenile offender is unconstitutional.